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Race, Nationality, and
Reality: INS Administration of Racial Provisions in U.S. Immigration and Nationality Law Since 1898, Part 2 |
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Somehow, late in the 1930s, the service was able to amend the procedure for recording race on naturalization (as opposed to immigration) records. Vague references to this change imply that traditional difficulties in "obtaining and recording proper information as to race" caused a revision of forms wherein the applicant no longer stated his race, but chose a racial designation from a list of those eligible to citizenship. This revision occurred prior to passage of the Nationality Act of 1940, evidenced by a May 7, 1940, edition of form A-2214, Application for a Certificate of Arrival and Preliminary Form for Petition for Naturalization. A blank calling for race does not appear on the form until page three, and refers the applicant to instructions listing the choices of white, African or African descent, or Filipino. "State to which one of these classifications you belong." All INS naturalization forms were revised after passage of the Nationality Act of 1940. Based on recommendations offered by a presidential committee studying naturalization problems since 1933, the act recodified all (and reconciled much) previous U.S. nationality law. Among proposals associated with the committee were some recommending elimination of any racial requirement for naturalization. Unfortunately, §303 of the new law extended racial eligibility to only one new group: descendents of races indigenous to the Western Hemisphere. Section 303 not only required INS to revise naturalization forms again, it raised a question of reinterpretation of the old §2169. Furthermore, it begged the question: Who are races "indigenous to the Western Hemisphere?" Recodification of nationality law forced the INS to examine all legal language and reevaluate its administration. It also became an opportunity to reinterpret §2169, which was not repealed but was replaced for INS purposes by §303. Though the 1940 law covered only naturalization, the legislative links between racial eligibility and immigration had been established earlier. Thus any change to racial classification in administration of naturalization could affect racial classification in the immigration arena. It was with this opportunity in mind that Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization Earl G. Harrison began his effort to remove Hebrew from the immigration List of Races or Peoples. Two months after taking office, Harrison asked Henry Bernard Hazard, an immigration and nationality law expert and director of the service's Research and Education Division, to review the practice of racial classification on INS forms and answer the question of whether "'Hebrew' was a race." After more than thirty years of working to standardize immigration and naturalization, Hazard may have shared Harrison's obvious desire to excise the word "Hebrew" from official forms. In any event, Hazard quickly submitted a long analysis of the question, concluding that Jews or Hebrews could not properly be considered a race, "at least not in the sense in which that term is used in the immigration law." More important, Hazard concluded that both "race" and "peoples" were subject to administrative determination under naturalization and immigration law. In his review of immigration's list, Hazard noted that the law required a record of each arriving immigrant's race but "has nothing to say about 'the people' to whom the alien may belong. The enlargement of the classification . . . to include 'peoples' appears to have been made arbitrarily, possibly because of the difficulty in determining just what the term 'race' might imply." Similarly, concerning the Nationality Act of 1940, Hazard concluded that neither the law nor regulations defined the term "race." As a result, whatever system the INS used to classify or supply race on naturalization forms was "a matter resting in administrative discretion." One year later, the term "Hebrew" no longer appeared on immigration forms and papers. Another area where the INS increased its use of administrative discretion related to racial eligibility to naturalization. As has been shown, the courts traditionally admitted or denied racially ineligible aliens during court proceedings, either according to or despite INS objections. But developments in administrative law generally began to provide INS officers with opportunities to make decisions outside the courtroom. The cases of Majid Ramsay Sharif (Shariph) and Noshad Khan are illustrative. Sharif, an Arab, applied for an immigration visa in 1941 but was denied as an alien racially ineligible to citizenship. Khan, an Afghan resident of the United States since 1926, faced deportation charges in 1941 for illegal entry but applied for discretionary relief as his deportation would be a hardship on his U.S. citizen wife and children. Whether the INS could afford relief to Khan and adjust his immigration status depended on whether an Afghan was racially eligible to naturalize. In both cases, because they were not petitions for naturalization, the questions went not to the courts but to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Administrative law could now determine the question of racial eligibility.
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Sharif's case involving the eligibility of an Arab, the board, like the
courts, relied on the Thind decision. Unlike the courts, the BIA
was persuaded by a brief for the U.S. government in the Thind case
that argued that "whiteness," for lack of a better term, is associated
with Western civilization, and Western civilization includes "so much of
the Near East as contributed to, and was assimiliable with, the
development of Western Civilization of Greece and Rome." Having recalled
the cultural link between the ancient and modern western worlds, the board
concluded "that it was not intended, either in 1790 at the time of the
first enactment of the governing statute or certainly in 1940 at the time
of its last enactment, that Arabians be excluded from the group of 'white
persons'." Unless one is prepared to believe immigration officials were
naturally more benign that Supreme Court justices, the Sharif case
demonstrates a changed "common understanding" in 1941 from that which
persuaded the court in 1923. Upon revisiting the Thind decision,
the BIA came to an opposite conclusion. The board exhibited equal
flexibility in the case of Noshad Khan, which had to overcome the 1928
In re Feroz Din decision that Afghans were not white persons. To do
so, the BIA questioned whether Americans had any "defined popular or
common understanding" of Afghans given there were only an estimated two
hundred Afghans then living in the United States. Without any popular
guide, the board turned to ethnologists who provided evidence that "an
Afghan is the exact prototype of the Persian." Since Persians had always
been considered racially eligible to naturalize, Afghans would be as well.
Because it departed so far from case law, the BIA forwarded its Khan
decision for approval by the attorney general, who in turn requested the
opinion of the INS. After the INS legal office supported the Khan
decision, the attorney general approved it on May 26, 1945. Afghans had
thus been found eligible to naturalize and to immigrate despite the
opinion of, and without the participation of, the courts. INS
changes to the classification of race and administration of racial
provisions in immigration and nationality law reflected changes in
American thinking or "common understanding." During the Seventy-eighth
Congress, in 1942 and 1943, eleven different bills were introduced
proposing elimination of racial barriers to naturalization. While most of
the bills only aimed to remove the bars to Filipino, Korean, or East
Indian naturalization, they indicated a willingness or desire on the part
of the American people to liberalize a restrictive policy maintained since
1924. It should not be forgotten that changes to naturalization at home
during World War II coincided with administrative naturalization of
soldiers serving in the U.S. Armed Forces overseas. Since the First World
War, Congress maintained legal provisions facilitating the naturalization
of U.S. soldiers despite racial ineligibility. During World War II, the
practical and propaganda value of naturalization ceremonies held in
Europe, North Africa, and the Pacific, in which representatives of all
corners of the earth came together to pledge themselves to American
ideals, fostered the image of the United States as the defender of
democracy worldwide. But they also stood in uncomfortable contrast to
continuing racial exclusions to citizenship on the home front.
Unlike American attitudes toward race, INS statistical methods in 1940
remained much the same as they had been at the turn of the century. The
ability, willingness, or practicality of changing INS racial
classification and coding depended on the service's perception of its
legal requirements to record and report racial statistics. That the INS
could alter or amend its statistical system became clear in the late
1930s, when additions and changes were made to the List of Races or
Peoples. Further change became possible after the realization, stated in
Henry B. Hazard's 1942 memorandum to Commissioner Harrison, that "race"
and "people" were not defined by law but by administrative practice.
Marian L. Smith is the senior historian for the US Immigration and Naturalization Service, Washington, D.C. She writes and speaks about the history of the agency.
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